تجدیدنظرگرایی دربارۀ ارادۀ آزاد و مسئولیت اخلاقی از نظر مانوئل وارگاس | ||
| شناخت | ||
| مقاله 7، دوره 12، شماره 2، بهمن 1398، صفحه 185-206 اصل مقاله (433.82 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: علمی - پژوهشی | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| سعید عدالت جو1؛ علی ارشد ریاحی* 2 | ||
| 1دانشگاه اصفهان، دانشکده ادبیات، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی | ||
| 2دانشگاه اصفهان، دانشکدۀ ادبیات و علوم انسانی، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی | ||
| چکیده | ||
| در این مقاله تجدیدنظرگرایی از نگاه مانوئل وارگاس بررسی شده است که نظریه‌ایست دربارۀ ارادۀ آزاد به عنوان شرط مسئولیت اخلاقی. این نظریه معتقد به دو تعبیر تشخیصی و تجویزی دربارۀ فهم متعارف از ارادۀ آزاد و مسئولیت اخلاقی است. تعبیر تشخیصی دربارۀ این است که در فهم متعارف ما، ارادۀ آزاد و مسئولیت اخلاقی با موجبیت علّی ناسازگار و انسان دارای ارادۀ آزاد است. تعبیر تجویزی دربارۀ این که فهم ما از این امور چگونه باید باشد. تعبیر تجویزی نمی‌تواند آزادانگاری باشد، زیرا باید عدم موجبیت را به طوری خاص در فرایند ذهنی تصمیم‌گیری فرض بگیرد و این لازمه از شواهد موجود فراتر است. تعبیر تجویزی حذف‌گرایی نیست، زیرا می‌توان با تجدیدنظر در فهم متعارف خود از این امور، آن را به شکلی اصلاح کرد که با دشواری روبرو نباشد. تعبیر تجویزی نوعی سازگارگرایی است، ارادۀ آزاد از این نظر توانایی تشخیص ملاحظات اخلاقی و هدایت رفتار خود در پرتو این ملاحظات است. این توانایی با موجبیت‌گرایی علّی سازگار است. این نظریه مبتنی برای کاربرد و توجیه نظام مسئولیت است. درپایان استفادۀ وارگاس از استدلال پیامد، استناد به شواهد تجربی و تکیه برهنجارهایی با مبنای آزادانگار برای تبیین تعبیر تشخیصی و تجویزی او مورد نقد قرار گرفته است. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| تجدید نظرگرایی؛ ارادۀ آزاد؛ مسئولیت اخلاقی؛ مانوئل وارگاس؛ سازگارگرایی؛ آزادانگاری | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Manuel Vargas’s Revisionism theory about free will and moral responsibility | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Said Edalat joo1؛ Ali Arshad Riahi2 | ||
| 1University of Isfahan, faculty of Literature and Humanities , Department of Islamic Philosophy and Kalam | ||
| 2University of Isfahan, faculty of Literature and Humanities , Department of Islamic Philosophy and Kalam | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Manuel Vargas’s Revisionism is a theory about free will and moral responsibility which emphasizes the application of the system of responsibility in the human community and its role in regulating and directing the behavior of humans. Revisionism must show that this theory is plausible in comparison to other competing theories. The plausibility of this theory depends on consistency with scientific investigations and normative adequateness. Revisionism first examines and criticizes the rival theories. Incompatibilists believe that causal determinism and free will are not compatible, and we cannot be morally responsible in the causal determined world. Regarding this response, Libertarianists believe that, given the incompatibility of these two, we have free will, and human decisions are not determined, and the Eliminativists believe that, given the incompatibility of these two, and the truth of causal determinism, we have no free will and moral responsibility. From the Libertarianism’s point of view, each person is naturally Incompatibilist and Libertarianist, according to his usual intuitions. This places the burden of reasoning on the opponents of Libertarianism, because they are opposed to ordinary intuitions and commonsense. There are two accounts of free will and moral responsibility: diagnostic and prescriptive. The diagnostic account describes commonsense beliefs about free will and moral responsibility. And prescriptive account aims to tell us how we ought to think about free will and moral responsibility. Vargas agrees with Libertarianists that the commonsense intuitions about free will are Incompatibilist. Vargas proposes three categories of considerations that, if considered together, is a strong reason for the incompatibilism about free will and moral responsibility. These three are the famous philosophical arguments, empirical evidence and historical and cultural history. These three are the famous philosophical arguments, empirical evidence, and cultural and religious history. For famous philosophical arguments, the Consequence Argument is mentioned, which is an indirect argument in defense of incompatibilism. Vargas makes different use of this argument. He thinks that the easiness and naturalness of an incompatibilist reading of this argument is the reason for the commonsense is incompatiblist about free will and moral responsibility. Prescriptive account isn’t Eliminativism, because we can revise our conventional understanding of these things, it was modified in a way that is not difficult. Because it can be corrected by revising our commonsense. The prescriptive account is a kind of compatibilism, free will, in this regard, is the ability to recognize moral considerations and guide their behavior in the light of these considerations. An important objection to Vargas is that the concept of easiness and naturalness of an incompatibilist reading of consequence argument is not clear. There is also another major criticism about the empirical evidence that Vargas has invoked: There is some evidence that contradicts his claim. It is also a mistake to use the current norms: Vargas himself has argued that the cultural and religious background, which is Libertarianist, has a fundamental role in the formation of norms, if so, how these norms are explained in the context of the revisionist theory? | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Revisionism, Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Manuel Vargas, Compatibilism, libertarianism | ||
| مراجع | ||
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