بررسی ارزیابی اسپینوزا از اراده آزاد دکارت | ||
| شناخت | ||
| مقاله 7، دوره 11، شماره 2 - شماره پیاپی 79، اسفند 1397، صفحه 165-182 اصل مقاله (371.03 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: علمی - پژوهشی | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| سیدمصطفی شهرآیینی1؛ مینا ذوالقدر* 2 | ||
| 1دانشیار و مدیر گروه فلسفه دانشکده ادبیات و زبانهای خارجی دانشگاه تبریز | ||
| 2دانشجوی دکترای دانشگاه تبریز | ||
| چکیده | ||
| در تاریخ فلسفهها میخوانیم که نظریۀ ضرورت در کانون اندیشۀ اسپینوزا، و نظریۀ آزادی اراده در قلب نظام دکارت جای دارد. اسپینوزا خدا را علت خود و علت داخلی میداند، اراده را از خدا و انسان نفی میکند، اختیار را منحصر در ضرورت آزاد میداند و بهضرورت انتشای عالم از خداوند تصریح میکند؛ تا جایی که بهنظر میرسد خط فکری خود را کاملاً از دکارت جدا کرده است. از مهمترین نقدهایِ اسپینوزا بر دکارت، انتقاد از دیدگاه او درباره ارادۀ آزاد است. اما بااینهمه، برخی دکارتشناسان دیدگاه اسپینوزا را در باب ضرورت، همچون رشد طبیعی فلسفۀ دکارت میبینند و برآنند که نقد اسپینوزا بر نظریۀ دکارت دربارۀ ارادۀ آزاد، ارتباط چندانی به ادّعای اصلی دکارت ندارد تا جایی که اگر مفهوم دکارت دربارۀ آزادی بهدرستی تقریر شود، دیدگاه اسپینوزا بیش از آنچه خود میپنداشت، به موضع دکارت نزدیک است. در این مقاله میخواهیم نشان دهیم که بهرغم انتقادات اسپینوزا بر نظریۀ اراده آزاد دکارت، دکارت آنگاه که سخن از بالاترین درجۀ آزادی به میان میآورد، همبستگی ضرورت و آزادی را همچون اسپینوزا نشان میدهد و در این مرحله از آزادی، او نیز میان فاهمه (عقل) و اراده هیچ تمایزی قائل نمیشود؛ بنا بر این، با توجه به آنچه دکارت در همة آثارش دربارة اراده و اختیار میگوید، انتقاد اسپینوزا بر دکارت مبنی بر قول او به ارادة مطلق و آزاد، پذیرفتنی نیست. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| آزادی اراده -اراده -ضرورت -تفویضگرایی؛ عقل | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Spinoza's evaluation of Descartes' free will | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| seyyed mostafa shahraeini1؛ mina zolghadr2 | ||
| 1the university of Tabriz | ||
| 2the university of Tabriz | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| This paper examines Deccartes’ theory of the freedom of the will and Spinoza’s well-known criticisms of it. In Spinoza’s critique of Descartes’ account of relation between intellect and will there seem to be two main strands. The first hinges on Spinoza’s theory of judgment and his thesis of the inseparability, in judgment, of the intellect and the will. The second strand relates to a more pervasive and general feature of Spinoza’s philosophy- his thoroughgoing determinism. Spinoza does not think that the will is distinct from the intellect, nor that it is endowed with the kind of freedom that Descartes postulates. As Spinoza himself puts it at Ethics II P48, in the section which leads on into the critique of Descartes we have just examined, there is no absolute or free will [sc. Of the kind Descartes supposed]. Cartesian freedom, Spinoza insists, is a kind of illusion. Men think themselves free because they are conscious of their volition, but not the causes thereof . For Spinoza , the non-freedom of the will (in what they take to be the “absolute” Cartesian sense) follows from the particular brand of rationalism. In the case of Spinoza, the denial of absolute freedom flows from what is often called his necessitarianism- a doctrin that is expressed most concisely in the Metaphysical Thoughts. The precise sense in which all things are ‘necessery’ for Spinoza has been the subject of debate: it is possible that he is prepared to allow that individual truths are not absolutely, but only ‘relatively’ necessary. But did Descartes in fact postulate the existence of an absolute, contra-causal freedom of the kind which Spinoza denied? In this paper will be argued that Spinoza misinterpreted Descartes on this point; the position which they take to be the Cartesian one does not correspond to the stance which Descartes centrally and characteristically adopts in his discussions of freedom. The centeral Cartesian position on freedom is much closer to that of Spinoza; indeed there is a sense in which Spinoza’s views, so far from being in radical conflict with Descartes’ , can be seen as a natural development of those of his predecessor. To describe Spinoza as having misinterpreted Descartes at once needs qualifying. The absolutist position which he attributes to Descartes is one for which some support can be found in the Cartesian texts. Unfortunately, the way Descartes expresses himself concerning the freedom of the will is often confusing; frequently his remarks seem open to an indeterministic interpretation. In spite of some important differences, there are many ways in which Spinoza’s views, so far from being anti-Cartesian, can be seen as a natural development of those of Descartes. Spinoza’s general critique of the Cartesian theory of the will dose not take sufficient account of what Descartes actually claimed, and that if the Cartesian concept of freedom is properly understood, Spinoza is closer to it than he himself recognized. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| free will, freedom of indifference, necessity, reason, will | ||
| مراجع | ||
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