انتخاب اخلاقی و مکانیسم مفسر: در دفاع از اخلاق فضیلت از منظر علوم اعصاب شناختی | ||
| مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق | ||
| دوره 1، شماره 1، فروردین 1404، صفحه 29-44 اصل مقاله (1.49 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.48308/jiethics.2025.239054.1002 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| حسن فتحزاده* | ||
| گروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه زنجان، زنجان، ایران. | ||
| چکیده | ||
| اخلاق فضیلت با جابهجاییِ تأکید از فعلِ اخلاقی به فاعلِ اخلاقی، ارزشمند بودنِ انتخابهای اخلاقی و پیروی از وظایفِ اخلاقی را به نیت و منشِ فراگیرِ عاملِ اخلاقی بازمیگرداند. اما تا کنون روایتهایی که از فضیلت مطرح شده یا متافیزیکی و سربسته بودهاند، و یا ایدئالیستی و دسترسناپذیر. در این پژوهش تلاش میکنم با تکیه بر دستاوردهای معاصر در حوزهی علومِ اعصابِ شناختی روایتِ سومی مطرح کنم که بتوان از اخلاقِ فضیلت به معنایی دفاع کرد که هم ایدهی آزادی را در بر بگیرد، و هم این که مداخلهی عواملِ غیرشناختی و تاریخمندیِ سوژه را به رسمیت بشمرد. به این منظور نخست به معرفیِ هستهی مرکزیِ آن، یعنی مکانیسمِ مفسر، میپردازم، که در واقع نظیرِ عصبشناختیِ ناآگاهیِ فرویدی است، و در ادامه با معرفیِ مدلِ «حالتِ هیجانیِ مرکزی» از کلیتی سنتتیک سخن میگویم که در ترکیبی از مؤلفههای درزمانی و همزمانی حقِ انگیختارهای اخلاقی را نیز در بحثِ منش ادا میکند. این پژوهش در واقع نگاهی عصبشناختی به مفهومِ «فضیلت»، و نقشِ بنیادینِ آن در انتخابها و رفتارهای اخلاقی است. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| مکانیسمِ مفسر؛ حالاتِ هیجانی؛ منش؛ اخلاقِ فضیلت | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Moral Choice and Interpreter Mechanism: In Defense of Virtue Ethics from the View of Cognitive Neuroscience | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Hassan Fatzade | ||
| Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, University of Zanjan, Zanjan, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Introduction: This paper seeks to integrate the longstanding tradition of virtue ethics with recent findings in neuroscience, offering an alternative account of virtue that relies neither on classical metaphysical assumptions nor on unattainable forms of idealism. By employing two key concepts—the interpreter mechanism and the central emotional state—we propose a new framework for rethinking the nature of virtue and its role in moral action, a framework in which freedom, historicity, and unconscious processes are deeply interwoven. Findings: The point of departure for this paper is a critical engagement with two dominant trends in contemporary accounts of virtue ethics: first, metaphysical readings that regard virtue as an inherent, immutable, and foundational property; and second, idealized readings that condition the realization of virtue on the formation of a perfectly rational, self-aware, and coherent personality. In contrast to both, this paper draws on neuroscientific theories—particularly the research of Michael Gazzaniga—to advance a more realistic and human-centered understanding of virtue. Discussion: We will outline our topics in several sections: The first section focuses on the concept of the interpreter mechanism; a process located in the brain’s left hemisphere that reconstructs and retroactively rationalizes our actions and experiences. Through unconscious narrative-building, this mechanism maintains our sense of identity and continuity, reducing internal fragmentation and psychological incoherence. From the author’s perspective, the interpreter mechanism operates as a kind of neurobiological analogue to the Freudian unconscious: a constructive, projective, and deceptive apparatus that not only responds to external stimuli but continuously reinterprets our actions after the fact. Within this framework, much of what is commonly understood as “virtue” or “moral character” emerges not from deliberate, conscious decisions but from these retrospective and narrative-generating processes. The paper then introduces the concept of the central emotional state as a hidden yet decisive factor in moral decision-making. Drawing on findings from neuroscience— particularly research on emotional decision-making, such as the Iowa Gambling Task, and Antonio Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis—we argue that emotions are not disruptive forces opposed to reason but rather fundamental components of cognition and choice. The central emotional state refers to a relatively stable, semi-unconscious configuration of emotional dispositions, functioning as an embodied “instruction set” that shapes each moral act. This state is both diachronic and synchronic: on the one hand, it is rooted in the individual’s emotional history and developmental trajectory (the diachronic dimension); on the other, it is dynamically activated in the immediacy of moral action (the synchronic dimension). Thus, virtue is not the one-time product of rational deliberation or moral training, but rather the enduring result of an affective-narrative continuity sustained over time. Moral character, therefore, is not a fixed unity but a narrative, emotional, and neurobiological construct that emerges through interaction with the interpreter mechanism. Interdisciplinary Studies in Ethics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2025 30 Finally, the paper offers a novel defense of virtue: virtue as the alignment between the central emotional state, the interpreter mechanism, and outward action. While such alignment is neither guaranteed nor complete, it provides a realistic foundation for rethinking moral agency. Within this view, the moral subject is no longer conceived as the hero of pure rationality but as a historically situated being, shaped by emotion and entangled in the narrative constructions of their own mind—yet still capable of authentic, ethical, and coherent action. By forging a bridge between virtue ethics and neuroscience, this paper opens a new path for reflecting on virtue—one that, rather than excluding emotion and the unconscious, acknowledges them as fundamental constituents of moral choice. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| Interpreter mechanism, Emotional States, Split brain, Character, Virtue Ethics | ||
| مراجع | ||
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کانت، ایمانوئل (1401). نقد عقل عملی. ترجمه سید مسعود حسینی. تهران: نشر نی.
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